This paper provides empirical evidence of the long-and short-term eects of exposure to political violence on human capital accumulation. Using a novel data set that registers all the violent acts and fatalities during the Peruvian civil conict, I exploit the variation in conict location and birth cohorts to identify the eect of the civil war on educational attainment. Conditional on being exposed to violence, the average person accumulates 0.21 less years of education as an adult. In the short-term, the eects are stronger than in the long run; these results hold when comparing children within the same household. Further, children are able to catch up if they experience violence once they have already started their schooling cycle, while if they are aected earlier in life the eect persists in the long run. I explore the potential causal mechanisms, nding that supply shocks delay entrance to school but don't cause lower educational achievement in the long-run. On the demand side, suggestive evidence shows that the eect on mother's health status and the subsequent eect on child health is what drives the long-run results. 
Introduction
Throughout the world, civil conicts have been widespread in the post-WWII period. During the past decade, economists have started analyzing the consequences of these conicts, with particular attention to their welfare eects. The short-run impact of civil conicts are clearly catastrophic.
However, recent analyses provide mixed evidence on the persistence of the eects of conict on human capital accumulation.
Using data from the Peruvian civil conict, this paper provides estimates of the eect of exposure to civil conict on short-and long-run educational achievement, showing that the eect on human capital is not only persistent, but more so if exposure to conict happens during certain periods of early life. The results show that the average person exposed to political violence before starting school (in early childhood and in pre-school age) accumulates 0.21 less years of education as an adult. The short-term eects are stronger than in the long-run, showing that the persistence of the shock depends on the moment in life when the child is exposed to violence. Further, the results are robust to comparisons between siblings in the same household who were exposed to violence in dierent periods of their lives.
Pioneering theoretical work in this area links armed conicts and economic performance from a macroeconomic perspective. 1 These studies were followed by empirical cross-country applications, which suggest that countries see a steep decline on a variety of welfare indicators when the war ends, yet there is signicant recovery in most of these dimensions.
2 Studies exploiting variation within regions of the same country arrive at similar conclusions.
3 However, as Blattman and Miguel (2009) point out, beyond the trends revealed by cross-country evidence, it is hard to draw conclusions about how does violence aects individual and household welfare, for which we need detailed country analysis.
1 See: Collier and Hoeer 1998, Collier (1999) , Collier and Sambanis 2005, among others 2 Chen, Loayza and Reynal-Querol (2008) look at 41 countries that suered civil conicts between 1960 and 2003, nding that after the war ends, there is signicant recovery in terms of economic performance, health, education and political development. Moreover, Cerra and Saxena (2008) nd that most of the output losses due to conict are recovered in a very short period of time.
3 Miguel and Roland (2005) look at the long term consequences of the massive US bombings in Vietnam, nding that 27 years after the end of the war there was no detectable impact on poverty rates, consumption levels, literacy levels, infrastructure, or population density. Davis and Weinstein (2002) and Brakman, Garretsen and Schramm (2004) arrive at similar conclusions based on evidence from the allied bombing in Japan and West Germany, respectively.
In general, this literature concludes that the eects of severe periods of violence on economic outcomes and human welfare tend to vanish over time.
Micro-level studies have gone further in unveiling the relationship between individual welfare and civil conict. The research in this area has focused on the immediate eects of conict on health and educational outcomes. Using micro data, exploiting the variations in geographical incidence of conicts, and using dierent cohorts as control groups, several authors have found that there are economically and statistically signicant eects of exposure to violence on education and health outcomes.
4 However, it might be the case that people exposed to conict at some point of their lives suer an initial negative shock, from which they recover after a certain time, mirroring the patterns observed in the cross country literature. If this were the case, the studies cited above are only measuring the short term consequences of violence, while neglecting the fact that these eects will disappear as time goes by. This paper contributes to the literature relating civil conict and human welfare in several respects. First, I provide the rst micro-estimates in the literature about the short-and long term eects of civil conict on educational attainment, showing that the eects of violence are persistent in time. Second, I use a high quality data set representative at the national level which contains the universe of human rights violations reported during the civil conict in Perú across districts and years. Further, the structure of the data allows me to estimate the short-term eects of violence by comparing siblings exposed to conict at dierent stages of their lives. Finally, using alternative data sets, I determine whether supply or demand shocks are more relevant for the persistent eect of violence exposure on adult educational attainment. 4 Akresh and de Walque (2010) use micro data collected four years after the Rwandan genocide to assess its impact on school attainment of children exposed to the conict. They nd that children (directly) exposed to violence accumulate 0.5 less years of primary education. Akresh, Verwimp, and Bundervoet (2010) look at the eects of the same conict on child stunting, comparing the eect of violence with economic shocks, concluding that girls and boys exposed to the conict have lower height for age z-scores. Using a similar research design, Akresh, Bundervoet and Verwimp (2010) , assess the eects of the civil war in rural Burundi on health outcomes shortly after the termination of the conict, nding that an extra month of exposure to the conict reduces the children's height for age z-scores by 0.047sd's. Arcand and Wouabe (2009) analyze the Angolan 27-year long civil conict, nding that in the short-run, conict intensity worsens child health, does not signicantly aect household expenditures, increases school enrollment and decreases fertility, as would be predicted by a Neoclassical unitary household model. The long term impacts found in this study are signicantly dierent from those documented for the short term. In one of the only studies that is able to identify the impact of a direct exposure to violence (either by being abducted or directly aected) on education and labor market outcomes, Annan and Blattman (2010) nd that educational losses are closely associated with time abducted, while those reporting the most psychological distress have been exposed to the most severe war violence and are disproportionately, but not only, former combatants. Outside of Africa, Shemyakina (2006) analyze the eect of the 1992-1998 civil conict in Tajikistan, nding that children who had experienced violence related shocks are less likely to be enrolled in school. The eects found are stronger for girls than for boys. Likewise, Swee (2009) nds that living in a municipality exposed to the Serbian-Bosnian conict decreases the likelihood of completing secondary education. In Latin America, Camacho (2009) shows that women exposure to the Colombian conict during pregnancy causes children to be born with lower weight.
My identication strategy exploits the variation in the temporal and geographical incidence of the conict, relying on a large set of geographic and time xed eects, along with province specic time trends. After partialing out district and year specic variation, I argue that the incidence of violence is not correlated with any determinant of educational achievement: the geographical and temporal expansion of the conict followed clear political and strategic guidelines from the rebel group, taking the war from rural areas in the highlands to the rich coastal districts (to try to control Lima, the capital city), and the coca region in the jungle (to secure sources of nancing).
The results show that the average person exposed to political violence before starting school (in the early childhood, and pre-school age) accumulates about 0.21 less years of education as an adult.
This eect is more important for women than for men, and for indigenous language speakers than for Spanish speakers. The short-term eects are found to be stronger than the long-run, showing that the persistence of the shock depends on the moment in life in which the child was exposed to violence. The eects on educational achievement are also observed on labor market outcomes.
Seen through the lens of a classic education production function model, the evidence suggests that the exposure to violence aects adult human capital accumulation through both a supply and a demand side eect. On the supply side, having a teacher killed in the community has a strong impact on educational decit by delaying school entrance. However, this eect does not have a longterm impact on educational attainment. On the demand side, suggestive evidence shows that the eect observed is not explained by short-or long-term shocks on household's wealth, but I observe a persistent decrease on mothers' health status after a violence shock, which translates into lowering childrens' health.
Overall, the results in this paper reinforce the idea that shocks during the early stages of one's life have long term irreversible consequences on human welfare. Further, relief eorts in the case of violence shocks should be targeted rst to pregnant mothers and young children, and then to children in the early stages of their schooling cycle if we want to minimize the long term welfare losses for society. 6 This economic decline hit peasants in the rural highlands particularly hard, making regional inequalities even worse. For example, in the southern highlands (where the PCP-SL emerged) the infant mortality rate was 128/1000 births, while nationwide it was about 92/1000; more than 80% of the population in the area lack access to drinking water, and the ratio of people per doctor was astronomically high (17,000 per doctor), while the nationwide ratio was 1,255 (Weinstein, 2007) .
During that time, education was expanding, 7 while employment opportunities for educated individuals (and especially for university graduates), was stagnant: university enrollment more than doubled from 1970 to 1990 (from 19% to 40%), while the unemployment rate for university graduates in the early 1990's was more than double relative to that of other levels of education (McClintock, 1998) . This expansion of the educational sector, created a widespread idea of progress in the population, which wasn't fullled by the capacity of the economy to absorb the newly educated workforce.
The CVR considers this status inconsistency as the main breeding ground in which the PCP-SL was able to spread its ideas and gain supporters among poor peasants in the highlands and urban 5 It is important to note that before the war was formally declared on that date, there had been no previous violent political activity headed by the PCP-SL.
6 The average annual growth rate during the 1970's was 0.7%, and it declined to -3.2% in the 1980's.
7 Government expenditures towards the expansion of the educational sector had been steadily growing since the 1950's, resulting in almost universal access to primary education by the early 1980's. marginal population.
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The armed conict started in the department of Ayacucho, in the south-central highlands, where most of the activity of the PCP-SL was concentrated between 1980 and 1982, as shown in Figure   1 . The political strategy of the PCP-SL was inspired by the Chinese revolution and consisted of war advancing from the rural areas to the cities.
9 The organization of the movement was highly decentralized, with regional committees formed of a very small number of trained cadres and nanced by local resources. The main focus in the early stages of the revolution was on political activity: agitation, mobilization, and popular education. Violence was only used to impose discipline in PCP-SL communities: militants identied the most hated members of the community, and implemented popular justice . As the war progressed, violence extended to executing all representatives of the establishment. As Figure 2 shows, there were two clear peaks in violent activities. The rst one started in 1983, when the government launched their anti-terrorist activities. The second period of intense violence was triggered by the decision of the central committee of the PCP-SL in its rst congress (1988) to prioritize the war in the cities (Weinstein, 2007 and CVR, 2004) .
Among the victims of the PCP-SL attacks, we nd popular leaders and land holders. However, the civil population was also severely threatened by the terrorists: whenever a village declared itself against the revolution, it was brutally punished. Moreover, victims from roadside attacks for collection of supplies and food for the revolutionary army were mostly traders and farmers. Attacks on the civil population were a common episode during the war, as can be seen in Table 2. 10 Public infrastructure was a frequent target of the attacks; unfortunately, my data set does not capture these episodes since it only focuses on human rights violations. For my purposes, it is important to note that school infrastructure was not hit by either of the parties involved in the conict.
In September 1992, when the violence in the country was at its peak and the attacks in the cities were frequent, the head of the revolutionary army, together with most of the central committee of the party, were captured and incarcerated. From that point on, violent attacks from the PCP-SL 8 On average, the areas where the PCP-SL started their actions had a higher educational level than other areas of the highlands. As a robustness check for my results, I also run all the analysis excluding these areas (see Table 14 ).
The main insights of the paper remain unchanged if we do this.
9 The geographical evolution of the war is shown in Figure 1 , from which we can clearly distinguish the expansion pattern towards Lima (the capital), as well as the higher incidence of violence in the coca area.
10 The data included in Table 2 has to be interpreted carefully, since about 20% of the individual cases of human rights violations do not have information on the occupation of the victim. decreased signicantly and its power within the country was under control.
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Overall, there were fatalities reported in all but two departments (out of 25) of Perú at some point. The CVR estimates that about 69,290 people were killed, 12 out of which 54% were attributed to the PCP-SL; the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA) was responsible for 1.5% of the deaths; and the remainder of deaths was perpetrated by agents of the state (police, army, navy, etc.) or paramilitary groups.
The Data
Information about the presence and intensity of violence comes from the data set collected by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR), which has detailed records of every human rights violation reported during the period of civil violence in Perú. Particularly, the information used in this paper corresponds to illegal detentions, kidnapping, murder, extra judiciary executions, torture, or rapes. On the other hand, individual level records from the 2007 and 1993 census allows me to identify the year and district of birth of each individual. I can merge the violence data with the census data, thus identifying the number of human rights violations that took place in the district of birth during the year when each person was born, as well as in every year before and after birth.
13
In 2001, during the transition to democracy, the government appointed the CVR, which was in charge of shedding light on the violent period between 1980 and 2000, as well as to establish which agents were responsible for human rights violations that took place in that period.
14 One of the main tasks of the CVR was to travel around the country holding public hearings during which they gathered testimonies from victims, relatives, witnesses, and survivors to report any act of violence between 1990 and 2000.
15 All the testimonies were individually coded in order to identify the type of act (rape, murder, torture, etc), location, potential responsible group (armed forces, PCP-SL, 11 Even though after the capture of Abimael Guzman, reports of human rights violations are still reported to the CVR, the vast majority of this violence was responsibility of the government of Alberto Fujimori. The ex-president was just convicted for some of these charges.
12 This estimate was made based on a cross sample methodology.
13 In later sections, I also merge the violence information with data from the 2007 National Household Survey (ENAHO) , and the 1992 DHS using a similar aggregation level.
14 A total of thirteen commissioners were appointed. The CVR had to be politically impartial, thus Commissioners picked were representative public gures from the civil society, human rights organizations, academic sectors, the military, the church, and represented dierent political views. Even though there are claims that the left was overrepresented in the CVR, the public consensus is that the commissioners represented an impartial political view.
15 The public audiences were widely advertised in the locality where the audience was going to be held, as well as in the neighboring localities. Additionally, communities could ask for an audience to be held in their town.
MRTA, etc.), identity of the victim and individual characteristics.
16 Importantly, the reported occupation of the victims allows me to identify whether a teacher was a victim of violence in a particular year and district, which will be helpful when trying to pin down the causal channels of the observed eect. It is important to note that the data set only includes human rights violations and not attacks to public infrastructure, hence I am only identifying the eect of being exposed to violence against human beings in the close environment (within the district), and not of the destruction of economic infrastructure or public utilities. On the other hand, when analyzing the short term eects of violence I use the information gathered in the 1993 census, which was applied right at the point when political violence started its decline. In this case, people exposed to the political violence are mostly of school age, and the 16 The data gathered from this process were merged and cross tabulated by the identity of the victim with the original registry information from six other data sets gathered at dierent points in time by human rights organizations, the judiciary, NGO's, and the ombudsman's oce. In this process, the CVR identied approximately 45,000 cases. After dropping double-coded cases and those that could not be cross-validated, the sample size drops to 23,149 individual fatalities (only disappeared or dead). Additionally, in a separate data set, the CVR also coded the testimonies as violent acts, which include detention, kidnapping, murder, extra judiciary execution, torture, rape, among others; in this data set, each of the 36,019 observations represent one violent act recorded. The former constitutes a subset of the later, hence I use this information for the analysis. 18 The population included in the sample is children of school age (6-17).
The main independent variable will be the number of years of exposure to violence during dierent stages of the early life in the district of birth. The stages of life that I consider are: early childhood (-2 until 3 years old), pre-school (4 to 6 years old), primary school age (7 to 12 years old), and high school age (13 to 17 years old).
19 Similarly, I will also consider the number of human rights violations at each stage, to get an estimate of the eects of the intensity of violence. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis, by violence exposure status. On average, people in the 2007 sample have about 9.4 years of primary and secondary education (out of 11). Further, when I split the sample by violence exposure status, people who were ever exposed to violence in the relevant period in their districts have, on average, one more year of education (9.7) when compared to those whose birth district was never exposed to violence while they were children (8.7 years). Likewise, when I look at the educational decit among school aged children in the 1993 census, those who were exposed to violence in their birth districts are 1.02 years behind in school, while children who had no experience with war fall back in school by an additional 0.54 year of school. This evidence is consistent with the status inconsistency argument presented in the previous section, according to which violence arises in areas where the population is more educated and thus more frustrated by the poor economy. All covariates shown are balanced between people born in violent compared to non-violent districts.
Theoretical Framework and Empirical Strategy
Consider a typical education production function model in the spirit of those discussed in Hanusheck (1979) , where the stock of education (S t ) for an individual in period t is a function of her endowments in each period (E 1 , ..., E t ), the history of educational inputs to which she had access (N 1 , ..., N t ), 18 Formally, this variable is dened as the age of the person, minus the mandatory age to enter school (6), minus the number of years of education completed. factors related to the (time-invariant) demographic characteristics X (i.e. gender, language), and community characteristics (C 1 , ..., C t ).
The endowment at each period of time, E 1 , ..., E t , is determined by both, demand and supply side factors. Among the former, there are genetic factors (G), household's endowments (E h 0 ), and environmental experiences and conditions at the start of each period (V t ). The supply side factors to be considered are denoted by C t , and one can think of them as school supply, or number of teachers available in the community:
The date and location of birth jointly determine the exposure of any given child to the violence.
Hence, the reduced form of the model allows me to identify the deviation of an individual outcome from the ones born in the same year, as well as of one's birth district, and the long run trend in the expansion of education in the province. To be able to identify this eect, I exploit the exogenous variation provided by the moment when the civil conict started, as well as its geographical localization.
The reduced form equation to be estimated directly follows equations (1) and (2):
where S ijt is the number of years of schooling achieved by individual i born in district j, and in year t. I include a province specic cubic time trend, which is intended to capture long-run changes, such as dierentiated economic development, or the intensity in the construction of schools in a particular province. Further, this variable isolates the variation in a person's outcomes which diverge from the long run trends in his/her birth province. X i is a vector of individual time invariant characteristics, such as gender, or ethnicity.
The inclusion of district of birth intercepts (η j ) controls for any district specic time-invariant characteristics. Similarly, I allow for cohort eects by including year of birth specic xed eects (ν t ). Finally, ijt is a random error term.
A particular problem arises due to the fact that educational achievement is a stock variable, hence districts with higher educational achievement in a given year will very likely have similar (or higher) educational achievement the following year. Likewise, there might be education spillover eects between districts. To deal with the spatial and time correlation in the error terms, standard errors will allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance structure within birth district by clustering them.
From equation (3), the focus is on the coecients associated with t V iolence jt , which is a set of variables indicating the number of years of violence exposure in each period of one's life: early childhood (-2 until 3 years old), pre-school (4 to 6 years old), primary school age (7 to 12 years old), and high school age (13 to 17 years old). These variables are intended to capture the eect of having the bad luck of being born in a violent period, and in a district exposed to violence. Additionally, in the next section I also use as independent variables of interest measures of the intensity of violence in each year. Consistent with the model presented above, exposure to violence can aect individual endowments (E 1 , ..., E t ) through several channels. For example, violent attacks of the PCP-SL can aect E h 0 by killing a member of the household, which represent a direct income shock for the household that could last several years. Hence, if a household suers from this shock some years before the child is born, it could still aect the nutrition of the child. Other potential pathways are the nutrition of the mother, or of the child himself once he is born, which may cause irreversible consequences for her/his future school attainment through long lasting eects on cognitive abilities. On the other hand, Camacho (2009) presents evidence suggesting that violence related stress during pregnancy has negative eects on the child's birth weight, which in turn aects cognitive development. Another channel through which violence exposure could aect the child before s/he is born is through traumatic experiences that aect the mothers and thus the child's development. Finally, this eect can also be more direct, psychologically aecting the child himself, which will in turn aect his cognitive abilities (Grimard and Lazlo, 2010).
Violence could also aect the community educational resources (C 0 ), as in the Sierra Leonean and Ugandan cases (Bellows and Miguel, 2009, Annan and Blattman, 2010) . However, the destruction of educational infrastructure during the conict by any of the parties involved was not an issue in Perú: the PCP-SL had strong beliefs about the role of education on the revolution, which is clear from the great inuence they had on the teacher's union. On the other hand, schools are a very valued asset within a community, thus if the army was to gain the support of the community to ght the terrorists, they didn't had an incentive to destroy school infrastructure. Sadly, a consistent series of information about the number of schools, or the number of teachers at the district level is not available. As suggestive evidence, Figure 3 shows the pattern in public expenditures in education during the period 1970-1997. It is clear from the gure that despite the small dip in expenditures between 1983-85, there is an increasing trend in the public expenditures in the educational sector.
Since the inuence of the rebels on the teachers was known, one channel through which violence aected C t was the capture or even murder of the local teacher on the hands of the national army: about 3% of the reported human rights violations were against teachers (see Table 2 ). Further, it was not an easy task to replace a teacher in a violent area.
Results and Discussion

Long term consequences of the conict
My main goal is to estimate the causal impact of exposure to violence on schooling. In order to do so, I use a large set of district and year xed eects, as well as province specic time trends. The district of birth xed eects control for any specic characteristics of all children born in the same locality. Similarly, the year of birth xed eects absorb any shock common to all households with children born in the same year. The exible province-specic trends included in all the regressions account for the dierential developments of each province of the country through time. One must bear in mind the inclusion of this large set of xed eects when interpreting the results, since they will not represent the impact of violence on schooling at the national level, but the average aect with respect to local averages, year averages, and purged of province exible trends. Further, I
consider the estimates presented as conservative, since the district xed eects are eliminating some valuable cross-sectional variation in the violence data.
The main identifying assumption needed to consistently estimate the causal eect of exposure to violence on educational achievement is that, after controlling for a broad set of district and year xed eects, and a province specic time trend, the error term is uncorrelated with the incidence of violence. This assumption will be violated if there was a selection problem whereby districts aected by violence were also those with lower growth of educational achievement. However, as explained in Section 2, and illustrated in Table 1 , one of the main breeding grounds for the PCP-SL to get popular support was the status inconsistency , that is, the localities where the PCP-SL started where those with relatively high levels of education and low opportunities for social mobility. For my purposes, this means that if anything, there should be a negative correlation between the localities where the conict started and educational achievement. Further, as shown in Figure 1 , the expansion of the conict followed clear strategic and political objectives, which are uncorrelated with the distribution of education.
One way of checking if there is a selection problem in my sample is to compare pre-violence levels and trends of education between the districts that were aected by violence, and those that are used as controls. In the 1993 census I can compare the educational level of the cohorts that, at the time of the start of the conict, were old enough to have nished their educational cycle. Panel A of Table 3 shows the average years of education of the cohort of people who were between 17 and 22 in 1980, separating them by the number of years of violence exposure of their birth districts. People born in districts that were never aected by violence had about 7.4 years of education, while those who were born in a district that was exposed to violence between 1 and 3 years have slightly more education (7.5 years). Likewise, those born in districts with higher levels of exposure have about 7.3 years of education. None of the dierences between these groups of districts are statistically signicant, and the same pattern holds for previous cohorts. Further, not only are the pre-violence levels of education are balanced, but cohort dierences are as well. Panel B in Table 3 shows the dierence in educational attainment between dierent cohorts, across districts with dierent levels of violence exposure. People born in a non-violent district were not increasing their educational level signicantly more than those born in violent districts. 20 Table 4 shows the results of the main specication presented in equation (3). In all the specications I use a set of variables indicating the number of years that each individual was exposed to violence during each period of the early life: early childhood (-2 to 3), pre-school (4 to 6), primary 20 As an additional test for the identication assumption I also run regressions to see whether pre-war education levels (or cohort dierences) predict the intensity of violence, nding a positive correlation between pre-war educational attainment and the intensity of violence, which reinforces the arguments above. The results are ommitted, but are available upon request. school (7 to 12), and secondary school age (13 to 17). 21 Being exposed to violence before entering school, this is, during the early childhood or in pre-school age has a statistically and economically signicant eect on long-run human capital accumulation. As shown in column (1) in Table 4 , an additional year of exposure to violence between two years before the birth of a child and the time s/he was three years of age implies that s/he will accumulate 0.06 less years of education, while being exposed to a similar shock during pre-school age (4 to 6), leads to about 0.05 less years of education per each year of exposure to violence.
22 On the other hand, living in a district aected by violence while you are in primary or secondary school age does not have a signicant impact on long run educational achievement. Further, I expect that any violent shock experienced by the household during the years before the mother was pregnant will not have any eect on the child's educational outcomes. As a robustness check, Column (2) tests this hypothesis by including indicators for the presence of violence in the district of birth during the years before the mother was pregnant, and as expected, I do not nd any statistically signicant eect for these variables.
23
One potential concern with the results shown in Column (1) 24 The coecients associated with violence in the critical period of early life (two years before birth until 3 years old), and pre-school years (ages 4 through 6) are still signicant at the conventional levels and their magnitude is slightly increased compared to those shown in column (1).
On average each child who was ever aected by violence during early childhood, and in the pre-school years had about 2.6 and 1.9 years of exposure, respectively. This means that the average 21 The results are robust of the choice of the years grouped together. 4 show the results year by year. The inclusion of the years before birth in the early childhood period reects the fact that violence shocks can have persistent eects on the mother's health status, which would negatively impact children's development. Evidence along these lines is provided in the last section of the paper.
22
The point estimates are not signicantly dierent from each other.
23 As a robustness check, I also run these regressions considering only fatalities (number of deaths and disappeared).
The results are very similar in magnitude and statistical signicance.
24 I test whether the coecients of violence exposure before two years before birth are jointly statistically signicant.
An F-test fails to reject the null that all the coecients are statistically dierent from zero at the 10% in column (2) and column (3) of Table 4. child who was exposed to violence in his/her early childhood accumulated about 0.14 less years of schooling than his/her peers in peaceful districts, or born in peaceful years; while if s/he was exposed to violence between 4 and 6 years old, the eect for the average child exposed to violence is 0.09.
25 Moreover, I can be fully exible in the functional form assumed to t equation (3), and include indicators for each year exposed to violence. Figure 4 shows these results in a graphical way.
Consistent with the results shown in Table 4 , violence exposure before the mother was pregnant (3 to 6 years before) is not statistically dierent from zero, while this eect is relevant while the child is between -2 and 6 years of age. The coecients corresponding to older ages are again indistinguishable from zero.
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To put these results in context, Duo (2001) nds that the eect of the massive school construction program in Indonesia on school attainment is of about the same magnitude, but in the dierent direction: each school constructed per 1,000 children led to an increase of 0.12 to 0.19 years of education. In the context of war exposure, Akresh and de Walque (2010) found that four years after the Rwandan genocide children (directly) exposed to violence accumulate 0.5 less years of primary education.
Not only the presence of violence in the birth district during the sensitive period is relevant in determining future schooling outcomes, but also the intensity of violence matters. Table 6 replicates the regressions presented in Table 4 replacing the variables used in equation (3) 26 As a robustness check, I run the same specication excluding regions of the country that had a particularly high and continuous presence of violence (Ayacucho and Huancavelica), those that were close to the coca producing areas (Huanuco and San Martin), and the capital city (Lima), which is signicantly more urban and rich than the rest of the country. The results are very similar, and are shown in Table 14. 27 Sadly, yearly information about the population per district is not available for each year. If there was higher migration out of the violent districts, the results shown in this table are be biased upwards. This bias does not aect the results of the previous table.
specication strategy, Table 5 shows the eect of being exposed to violence on the probability of being part of the informal sector, the probability of being employed, and on labor income. In column (1), I run the same specication as the one shown in Table 4 , for comparison purposes, and nd a similar eect in terms of magnitude and statistical signicance. However, in this case I only nd that exposure to violence is relevant for shocks during the early childhood. While I don't observe that violence has an eect on informality [NB: What do you mean by informality? -JR], people who were exposed to an additional year of violence during the early childhood are 1.3% less likely to be employed. Moreover, people who have a job and had experiences with violence in their close environment earn about 2% less in the labor market.
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4.2 Heterogeneity of the eect Maccini and Yang (2009) in their study on the eects of early life rainfall on adult welfare nd that experiencing a weather shock in early life has a negative persistent eect on welfare, but the eect is only signicant for women. This suggests that, in times of hardship, there may be a dierent preferences for boys and girls, giving priority to the latter whenever the household faces a negative income shock. On the other hand, the CVR documented that about three fourths of the victims of violence during the war were indigenous 29 .
Following these ideas, Table 7 divides the sample by gender and ethnicity to see if there are dierential impacts in these particular subgroups of the population. Consistent with the ndings mentioned above, Table 7 shows that the results are mostly driven by the eect for women. The point estimates for the exposure to violence in all periods are larger for girls than those found inmybenchmark specication in the rst column, and statistically signicant for exposure during the early childhood, and in the pre-school period. This implies that on average an extra year of violence in the district of birth in during the early childhood translates into 0.07 fewer years of education, while during the pre-school period it means about 0.08 less education as adult women. On the other hand, for men only exposure to violence during early childhood seems to be an important 28 When I split the sample by migration status and gender, I nd that the eect is basically driven by people who still live in their birth district, and it is more important for men than for women. These results are available upon request of the interested reader. Galdo (2010) provides estimates of the eects of violence on labor market outcomes that are consistent with my results, even after correcting for the attenuation bias though an IV procedure.
29 Indigenous people are dened as those that have an indigenous mother's language: Quechua, Aymara, or an amazonic language. determinant of future schooling, and the coecient is smaller in magnitude. Meanwhile, I nd that the eect for indigenous language speakers is larger than for Spanish speakers; however, these results are not statistically signicant due to a smaller sample size.
Potential biases and concerns
Sample composition
One of the drawbacks of using the information gathered by the CVR to measure the intensity of violence is that it comes from a non-random sample. The characteristics of the data gathering process make this a self-selected sample, since people voluntarily approached to the public hearings to tell their stories. Moreover, based on a much debated statistical procedure, the commission concluded that the total number of fatalities during this period was about 69,290, which is almost four times the number of observations actually recorded.
It is plausible that the under-reporting present in the data is coming from the group that was more aected by violence, i.e. those who had a harder time verbalizing the incidents in front of the Commission. Further, the testimonies were collected in relatively big towns, which implies that some of the most vulnerable populations (for whom the opportunity cost of reporting the violence were higher) were not able to report human rights violations. This possible selective under-reporting of the violence data is likely to lead to an under-estimation of my results. Hence, the point estimates found have to be interpreted as a lower bound. In any case, if this bias exists, it is more likely to show up in the regressions where I use the number of human rights violations, as opposed to those in which I include the number of years exposed to violence in each period. In the regressions using years exposed to violence, I code a year of exposure where there has been at least one violent event reported, therefore this bias is not likely to be picked up in this measure.
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Another possible bias in my result may come from the fact that the fatality victims of violence are not on the census. However, these people were those most aected by violence. Hence, the selection problem induced by the fatal victims again introduces a negative bias in the estimation of the eects of violence.
30 I also run the same set of regressions using being above the 20th and 30th percentile of violent districts as a cut-o to dene a violent district in a given year. The basic patterns observed in the results in the tables shown are unchanged.
Migration
A more serious concern comes from the fact that the questions recorded on the census only ask about the district of birth, where the person lived ve years before the interview, and the current location. I do not observe the actual migration history, or the reasons to leave one's hometown. The bias implied by the migration history cannot be signed a priori.
There is anecdotal evidence that people who migrated from violent areas were discriminated against in larger cities, denying them access to public services such as education or health care. If that were the case, the point estimates shown before would be overstating the eect of violence on schooling. On the other hand, people who migrate away from conict areas are likely to go to larger cities, where there are much more employment opportunities, better access to public services, and where they have a social network to support them. Hence, the development outcomes of people who migrated should be better than that of their peers left behind. In this case, including the migrants in the estimation would imply an underestimation of the eect.
Additionally, positive or negative selection into migration could also bias the results: if people who were able to escape from the violent districts were those at the top end of the income distribution, had they stayed, the eect on their human capital accumulation would have been higher. If that were the case, the estimates in Tables 4 and 7 would be overstating the impact of violence.
There is no clear way to disentangle the sources of migration bias, other than to address the question empirically. One indirect way to deal with this issue is to restrict the sample to people who still live in their birth districts, and compare the point estimates of the original sample with those of the non-migrants. Table 8 report on the estimation of the model, splitting the sample between those who report living in their birth-place and those who migrated at some point in their lives. The results show that the eect of violence for the non-migrants is slightly higher than in the full sample. On average, an additional year of exposure to violence during the early childhood for those children who still live in their birth place leads to 0.064 less years of schooling, while if they experienced violence when they were between 4 and 6 years old, they would accumulate 0.055 less years of education. Overall, the eect for non-migrants who were aected in both periods of their lives translates into about one quarter of a year less schooling.
For those who were no longer live in their birth district by 2007, the eect of violence exposure is also statistically signicant for both periods, but the coecients are slightly smaller. Being born in a violent district for children who migrated and were aected by violence in both periods, causes them to accumulate about 0.044 less years of education if the violence happened during the early childhood, and about 0.058 if it happened between 4 and 6 years old. This result is consistent with the ndings by Escobal and Flores (2009) , who document that mothers who migrate out of violent districts have children with higher nutritional status, when compared to their peers who stayed, but they nd no dierences on cognitive abilities.
In an additional robustness check, I regress the probability of migration on the incidence of violence in each year before and after birth, time invariant individual characteristics, a set of year specic eects, and a province time trend. Column (1) on Table 9 shows that violence exposure during the early childhood, or during pre-school age increases the probability of migration. However, once I include district specic intercepts in Column (2), there is no signicant association between migration status and exposure to violence. These results support the idea that migration is higher in the districts aected by violence, but this migration responds to a structural, time invariant characteristic of those districts, and the timing and location of violence does not dierentially aect the likelihood of migration.
Summing up, the eect observed in Tables 4 and 7 do not contain a signicant migration bias, and if anything, this eect will bias the estimates downwards.
Short term eects and possible causal pathways
So far I've shown that living through violent periods during critical periods of life causes lower school achievement in the long run. This nding contrasts with other studies which document that, after suering civil wars, countries are able to recover in most areas of development, such as nutrition, education, economic growth, etc.
31 In this section, I explore the extent to which the eect is vanishing over time by looking at the short-term impacts of political violence on schooling. Using a similar methodology as above, I estimate equation (3) on the data coming from the 1993 census. The dependent variable in this case is the educational decit, rather than school attainment. This variable is dened for children in school age (6-17) as the dierence between their age, the mandatory age for 31 See for example, Miguel and Roland (2005) , Davis and Weinstein (2002) , Brakman, Garretsen and Schramm (2004) , Cerra and Saxena (2008) .
entering school (6 years old in Perú), and the number of years completed in school. For example, a child who is 16 years old and has completed primary education (6 years of education) has a decit of 4 years, since she should have been in her fourth year of high school by that age. Given this denition, and the ndings in the previous section, I focus on the children in school age who report living in 1993 in the location where they were born.
The results are shown in column (1) of Table 10 . Being exposed to violence either in early childhood, pre-school age, or primary school age has a statistically and economically signicant eect on school decit. An additional year of violence in the district of birth during any of these periods of life causes a child to fall behind in school in about 0.1 years. Considering that the children exposed to violence in this sample were exposed to 2.4, 1.8, and 2.9 years of violence in each of the periods mentioned, respectively, this implies an average eect of 0.50 more years of school decit for the average child exposed to violence in these periods. Recall from The structure of the sample allows a tighter identication strategy. Given that the vast majority of children in school age still live in their parents' household, I could exploit the variation in the timing of violence exposure between siblings to identify the parameters of interest, keeping constant all time invariant household characteristics. Results are reported in Columns (3) and (4) Table 11 . In the short term, conditional of being exposed to violence, having a teacher attacked during early childhood or pre-school age leads to an increase in the school decit of about 0.30 and 0.17 years, respectively, as shown in columns (1) and (2). The fact that the eect is signicant whenever these events happened before the child was old enough to enter school, suggests that having a teacher injured or dead in the community delayed the entrance to school. Further, when I look at the long term eects of this type of violence, I nd that having a teacher attacked does not signicantly aect the long term accumulation of human capital. These results suggest that violence against teachers lead to a delay in school entrance, but do not cause a lower educational achievement in the long run.
On the other hand, I can also explore whether the eect is driven by a demand side shock.
A violence shock in the district can have an eect on health status, which in turn has long term irreversible cognitive eects. Using data from the 1992 DHS, and a similar specication as before, I
can test whether violence exposure has an eect on the weight for height, or height for age z-scores.
These results are shown in Table 12 . I indeed nd suggestive evidence that having a shock between two years before birth, and the rst year of life has a negative eect on health status. However, the reduced sample size limits my ability to do statistical inference in this case.
One other potential mechanism through which violence exposure might aect future educational outcomes is through household's wealth, which in turn has an eect on children's cognitive development. Even though I am not able to directly test this channel, I can use the information contained in the 1992 DHS to give some suggestive evidence. In column (1) of 
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Summarizing, I nd suggestive evidence of two potential channels through which violence aects educational achievement are: (i) a supply side shocks, specically attacks against teachers increase the educational decit of children exposed to the shock; and (ii) on the demand side, violent events between one year before the child was born and when she was one year old decreases her health status. Finally, this eect does not seem to go through shocks to household asset tenure, but through maternal health.
Summary and Conclusions
Civil conict is a widespread phenomenon around the world, with about three fourths of the countries around the globe having experienced an internal war within the past four decades (Blattman and Miguel, 2009 ). The short term consequences of these conicts are brutal in terms of lives lost, destruction of economic infrastructure, loss of institutional capacity, deep pain for the families of the people who died in the war, etc. However, the economic literature so far has had little to say about the long term eects of these conicts on those who survived, but still were exposed to them.
In this paper I address this issue, looking at the long-and short-term consequences of political violence on educational achievement in Perú.
The empirical literature dealing with the eects of civil conicts, especially at the macro level,
shows robust evidence that those countries exposed to severe violence are able to catch-up after a certain period of time, recovering their pre-conict levels in most development indicators. On the micro side, several papers document the very short-term consequences of conicts on human development, especially on nutrition and education. However, if the trends observed at the macro 34 It is important to have in mind the fact that the measure of violence only represents human rights violations, and does not capture any destruction of productive infrastructure, which are the most likely determinants of household economic status.
35 The fact that violence shocks one or two years before birth have an eect on maternal and child health speaks to the results shown in the previous section, where I observe that shocks preceding birth signicantly aect educational attainment.
level are followed at the micro level, one might expect these eects to vanish over time.
In this paper, I analyze the Peruvian case, in which the constant struggles between the army and the rebel group PCP-SL lasted over 13 years, causing the death of about 69,290 people, as well as huge economic losses. Using a novel data set collected by the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR), which registers all the violent acts and fatalities during this period, merged with individual level census data from 1993 and 2007, I quantify the long term eects that violence had on people exposed to it in the early stages of their life on human capital accumulation. The identication strategy used in the analysis exploits the exogenous nature of the timing and geographic localization of violence, which allow me to identify the average losses in educational achievement in the long term, with respect to local averages, year averages, and purged from province exible trends.
The results show that an average person exposed to political violence during the early childhood has 0.14 less years of education as an adult, while if the violence was experienced before entering school, but after the early childhood, this eect is of about 0.09 less years of education. This result is more important for women than for men, and for indigenous populations than for Spanish-speakers.
Some concerns with the sample composition and migrations issues leads us to think that these results ought to be interpreted as lower bounds of the estimated eects.
I also provide evidence that shows that the long-term eects are smaller than the short-term eects. This result contrasts with the cross-country ndings that the eects of violence vanish over
time. An interesting result of the paper is that children aected by violence are able to catch up if they are exposed to violence after they have already started their schooling cycle, while if they experience violence earlier in life, the eect is persistent.
Finally, I look at the potential causal channels though which this eect is working, nding suggestive evidence for two of the hypothesized mechanisms. On the supply side, attacks against teachers increase the educational decit of children exposed to the shock, mainly by delaying school entrance, but this eect does not have a correlate in long-term educational achievement. On the demand side, violent events in the two years around birth decrease the child's health status. This eect does not seem to go through shocks to household asset tenure, but through maternal health.
Overall, the results in this paper reinforce the idea that shocks during the early stages of one's life have long term irreversible consequences on human welfare. Further, relief eorts in the case of violence shocks should be targeted rst to pregnant mothers and young children, and then to children in the early stages of their schooling cycle if we want to minimize the long term welfare losses for society. 
Min.
Max.
Obs. No. of years exposed to violent events (early childhood) No. of years exposed to violent events (pre-school age) No. of years exposed to violent events (primary school age) No. of years exposed to violent events (high school age)
Exposed to violence at least once Note: For the 2007 census, I include all people between 18 and 32 years old. People considered ever exposed to violence are those exposed to violence in any of the relevant periods of analysis: early childhood, pre-school, primary school age, or secondary school age. In the case of the 1993 census, the statistics presented are for all children in school age (6-17) who, at the moment of the interview, still lived in their birth district, and similar to those form the 2007 census, those considered aected by violence are the ones who had at least one episode of violence in their birth district during the any of the relevant periods of analysis: early childhood, pre-school or primary school age. No. of years exposed to violence [1958-1963] -[1953-1957] [1953-1957] -[1948-1953] The periods of life considered are dined as follows: early childhood (-2 until 3 years old), pre-school (4 to 6 years old), primary school age (7 to 12 years old), and high school age (13 to 17 years old). 
Yrs. Of education Work in the informal sector (2) and (3) is dened as those workers who are not openly unemployed (work less than 35 hrs. per week), or work in a rm that is not registered, or does not keep accounting books (self reported); in columns (4) and (5), I consider occupied those workers who declare being employed, and working more than 35 hrs. per week; the log of the monthly income is taken over the labor income of those who declare being employed. (1) is at the household level. Controls include age of the household head, dummies for the maximum educational level in the household, number of members of the household, and a dummy for urban areas. In column (2), the unit of observation are mothers between 14 and 49 years of age with children between zero and ve years old. Controls include dummies for the educational level, age, an indicator for whether the mother is currently pregnant, number of household members, the asset index, and a dummy for urban areas. 
